By embracing countries where wages are up to 80 percent lower and unit labour costs up to 20 percent lower than the European Union (EU) average (EC, 2000), EU enlargement into central and eastern Europe (CEE) in May 2004 probably provides the toughest test ever in the history of European Works Councils (EWCs). If market integration makes social dumping, labour-cost-driven relocations, and coercive comparisons a threat, this will be most visible across the former East-West divide. In the new EU member states, the Directive on European Works Councils will become obligatory on the date of entry. Nevertheless, these countries have transposed it into national legislation well in advance (although to take effect on the date of EU accession). 1 Interestingly, in several cases, existing EWCs have already extended their coverage voluntarily to include CEE representatives.
Introduction
By embracing countries where wages are up to 80 percent lower and unit labour costs up to 20 percent lower than the European Union (EU) average (EC, 2000) , EU enlargement into central and eastern Europe (CEE) in May 2004 probably provides the toughest test ever in the history of European Works Councils (EWCs). If market integration makes social dumping, labour-cost-driven relocations, and coercive comparisons a threat, this will be most visible across the former East-West divide. In the new EU member states, the Directive on European Works Councils will become obligatory on the date of entry. Nevertheless, these countries have transposed it into national legislation well in advance (although to take effect on the date of EU accession). 1 Interestingly, in several cases, existing EWCs have already extended their coverage voluntarily to include CEE representatives.
This article presents exploratory research carried out through database analysis, questionnaires, and case studies in Poland. This is an important observatory since Poland is by far the largest of the new member states (39 million inhabitants, which is more than half the population of all 10 accession countries), the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI), and (together with Latvia and Lithuania), the 'poorest' (39 percent of per capita gross domestic product in the 'old' EU in 2002). Whereasrelations, 2 the specific issue of East-West tensions within multinational corporations (MNCs) is largely independent of the host country. The research addresses two main issues. The first is whether common labour regulations and organization may prove effective across the new socioeconomic border that divides old and new member states. Does the East-West divide in Europe cause tensions within EWCs? Are social dumping and labour-cost-driven relocations an issue? Do specific interest conflicts emerge between eastern and western representatives? The second issue relates to the impact of EWCs on Polish industrial relations: do they change the behaviour of local management and trade unions in any way?
After an introduction to the issue, two main elements of the research are presented. The first is a quantitative estimate, through a cross-analysis of three databases, of the Polish presence in EWCs, showing that the process of voluntary extension before the date of enlargement has been significant. This suggests that EU regulations in this area are not incompatible with the socio-economic situation of the new member states. Second, case studies (six companies with different levels of EWC integration) explore the effects of EWCs, especially upon the politically sensitive issue of relocations and upon industrial relations at the plant level. These effects appeared to be mainly indirect, but nonetheless important. They may be described as 'short circuits' caused by the sudden juxtaposition, through the EWC, of western and eastern European realities of industrial relations.
Foreign Direct Investment in CEE Countries: Risks of Social Dumping?
EU enlargement will have at least indirect effects on the so-called 'European social model' and on the Europeanization of industrial relations. Heterogeneity in economic and social standards within the EU will increase significantly, for instance, the coefficient of variation of gross wages will more than double (Kittel, 2002) . This raises fears that the creation of larger product markets including countries with different industrial relations arrangements will introduce unprecedented strain on a 'social model' based on relatively encompassing interest organization, welfare state coverage, and income equality (Dauderstädt, 2003; Kittel, 2002) . Industrial relations scholars have always been aware that labour regulations and organization have to cover the whole product market, or else are bound to be ineffective given capital mobility (Commons, 1919) .
In fact, 'undercutting' by lower wages in the CEE can only directly affect the minority of the labour forces in the pre-existing EU who are employed in sectors exposed to East-West international competition. A first, if temporary, form of this effect was through the outward processing trade between the EU and CEE in the mid-1990s, whereby western companies exploited privileged tariff treatment and wage differentials through outsourcing (Pellegrin, 2001) , but that mostly affected declining industries such as textiles, which are, in any case, subject to even tougher cost competition from East Asia. It is within internationally integrated MNCs that the effects of economic integration for labour can be observed most clearly.
The CEE has become one of the most attractive regions in the world for FDI, and has been the only one where inflows increased in 2001-02 in spite of the global recession (UNCTAD, 2003) . By 2003, Poland had climbed up to fourth position in the world, and the first in Europe, in the FDI Confidence Index published by the consulting firm A.T. Kearney (Financial Times, 2003) . According to the Polish Agency for Foreign Investment in 2003, the majority of FDI into Poland is not in declining, labour-intensive sectors, but in advanced manufacturing sectors such as transport equipment, chemicals, electrical equipment, and machinery. Even though most authoritative studies (Boeri and Brücker, 2000) have downgraded fears of massive relocations to the CEE in the aftermath of enlargement, a part of FDI is indeed efficiency-seeking. For instance, a large proportion of western investors in the automotive sector re-export more than 90 percent of their production back to western Europe (Pottier, 2003: 159; Red Square Trade International, 2001 ). The gap in productivity that at the aggregate national level may be an economic justification for international pay gaps, tends to be much lower within MNCs. Unit labour costs are therefore significantly lower and become a crucial motivation for automotive (and other) producers to locate in the CEE (Krifa and Vermeire, 1999) . FDI does not necessarily involve a 'race to the bottom' in employment conditions. MNCs in the CEE, on average, offer higher wages and higher wage growth and provide higher labour productivity (Barrer and Holland, 2000) than local companies, which may be seen as upwards harmonization. However, case studies have shown that the real impact of FDI is more complex, largely regardless of the country of origin, and may fall short of expectations (for example, Durand, 1997; Estrin et al., 1997; Keune and Tóth, 2001; Meardi, 2000) .
The elimination by EU enlargement of the residual barriers to the mobility of capital, goods, and services will affect employment relations in MNCs, at least indirectly. Given the lower mobility of labour, for social reasons as well as specific regulations, 3 the increase in capital mobility alters the balance of power between the two actors even if this mobility remains hypothetical. In particular, enlargement could increase the possibility of 'coercive comparisons' among operations in different countries. Recent evidence from Germany shows that employers see the CEE as an attractive location because of labour costs and tax exemptions (Stumpf-Fekete, 2001) , and that German investors in Hungary, while transferring technology and organizational models, tend not to export their home-country industrial relations practices (especially with regard to social cohesion and 'collective voice') (Fichter, 2003) . Internal competition from plants of the same firm located in other countries massively increases the agreement of defensive pacts for employment and competitiveness, which tend to undermine the German collective bargaining system (Rehder, 2001 ). More generally, there are signs from Germany of FDI being used 'to blackmail domestic industrial relations partners into making unprecedented concessions': a process which, it has even been argued, 'might blow apart the whole societal syndrome and thus undermine the social coherence of current German models of production organization and industrial relations' (Lane, 2001: 195, 207) .
A specific mechanism in this regard is the 'reverse diffusion of practices' (Edwards, 1998) , whereby MNCs can use subsidiaries' experiences to implement change in the parent company. Against the common view of the CEE as 'backwards', the context of economic transformation and EU accession makes the region a more permissive environment than most western European countries. The region thus provides MNCs with a veritable test bed for cross-border innovation and for the flexible diffusion of both tried and newly evolving practices along the production chain. Examples of experimentation by foreign companies in performance-related pay, internal mobility, and non-union representation have already been detected in Poland (Meardi, 2000) . The phenomenon may be most apparent in the already mentioned case of German FDI, where 'the strong desire of the top management of many MNCs to flee certain aspects of their country of origin business system and/or to learn from or experiment with aspects of other business systems' has been already reported (Dörrenbächer, 2002: 3) . The most notable case has been that of Audi's investment in Györ, Hungary, where innovations were clearly intended for extension to the whole Audi Group (Kessel and Dörr, 1998: 2) . Practice in the CEE might replicate (or exceed) the experience with German investors in Britain, some of whom modified their original German business approach not only at the local subsidiaries, but also at home-country sites (Ferner and Varul, 2000; Mueller and Loveridge, 1997) . In this regard, the capacity of EWCs to control the disruptive potential of EU enlargement on industrial relations is an important variable.
The 'Boundaries' of the European Works Councils
In the decade since the Directive formally establishing them, European Works Councils (the most advanced form of statutory transnational European Journal of Industrial Relations 10(2) employee representation ever created) have attracted an impressive amount of research interest, as documented by the 153-page literature review completed by Hoffmann and Müller (2001) . On the one hand, their role is strictly one of information and consultation, not negotiation. Far from promoting transnational collective action, on substantial issues they tend to be used by national representatives to defend national interests (Hancké, 2000) . On the other hand, EWCs are indeed emerging as European institutions, and not as simple extensions of home-country arrangements (Marginson, 2000) . Although they do not normally affect substantial decisions, they do have an impact on their forms of implementation (Marginson et al., 2004) . More generally, they promote transnational networking among unions, which, even if it does not produce immediate results, is an important step towards the Europeanization of industrial relations.
Existing research, however, has been largely limited to the EU's boundaries. The effects on non-EU-based multinationals covered by the Directive and on plants outside the EU have been investigated only very rarely. A systematic review of research on American MNCs found hardly anything on EWCs and nothing on their effects on the headquarters (Edwards and Ferner, 2002) . There are some exceptions, though. Nakano (1999) has investigated managers' views in Japanese MNCs; Marginson et al. (2004) detected a distinctive home-country effect in US firms; and the study by Quintana (2003) on EWCs in the banking sector builds up a critique of the Europeanization framework by considering the Latin American operations of Spanish banks.
The external dimension of EWCs is not only of interest for debates on globalization, but also has a more immediate practical relevance in the perspective of EU enlargement. The question is how EWCs will be implemented in areas with different social, political, and institutional traditions from the previous EU member states, and how they will cope with socio-economic disparities that are unknown within the former borders of the EU.
The role of EWCs in dealing with these tensions at company level must be seen within the broader tensions that may occur between western Europe and the CEE. According to Ladó, the 'relatively easy formal integration' of CEE social partners within the EWCs will go alongside the 'presumably growing tensions in the functioning of social dialogue structures', with even the risk that 'the trans-national institutions of social dialogue will be seriously challenged ' (2002: 116) . In this perspective, the impact of enlargement will be felt strongly in the West.
Unfortunately, there is little research evidence available to test Ladó's fears. There are some well-known cases of early, successful EWC extension to the East, such as Volkswagen. Less attention has been drawn to the limitations of such extensions. In the FIAT case, it took more than five years (from 1996 to 2001) to convince the employer to include Poland in the EWC, and in 2003 the 10,000 Polish employees were still represented by only one, non-elected observer from a minority union. In the case of Danone (a company highly regarded for social responsibility), in the first two years the new Polish EWC members received the invitation only in French, the day before the meeting, and with no travel refund (although the situation changed thereafter). The historic 'Eurostrike' at Renault in 1997, widely considered as the best EWC success story so far, had a rarely noticed limit: Slovenian workers did not follow their Belgian, French, and Spanish colleagues. Their trade unions did express formal solidarity, but in Slovenia there is no right to undertake solidarity strikes and above all the workforce would hardly have felt the need to support their western colleagues. In the event, the net result has been the relocation of production from Vilvoorde, Belgium, to Nove Mesto, Slovenia.
The best available research on EWCs in Poland has been carried out by researchers from the University of Łódź (Rudolf, 2001) . They interviewed 32 EWC members from 18 different companies, and provided a picture of the situation from the point of view of local representatives. Among the interesting findings are the high educational level of Polish representatives (a typical feature of Polish union officers as compared to their western counterparts) and the domination of Polish EWC representation by the unions (especially Solidarność). 4 This is noteworthy in a country where unionization is below 20 percent and unions have been hostile to works councils and any other non-union form of employee representation. The survey did not register significant obstacles to cooperation between 'first'-and 'second'-category EWC members, that is, between representatives from existing EU states and applicant countries, although cases of conflict of interest did appear.
The important research by Rudolf (2001) (EC, 2002: 118) . Fewer than a fifth of companies operating in applicant countries have taken on board local workers' representatives, either as observers or full members: the proportion ranges from 10 percent in Estonia to 27 percent in Slovakia. In Poland, according to the EC, only 23 out of 206 companies with EWCs (11 percent) allow local representatives to participate. Such estimates are always approximate. Our research tested the estimate of the Polish presence in EWCs through the use of local data, trying to achieve a more dynamic picture that distinguishes between degrees of EWC integration (see Table 1 ). For this purpose, three databases were cross-analysed: the 500 largest foreign investors, from the governmental Polish Agency for Foreign Investors (as at June 2001); the EWC database, from the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (1999) ; and the Solidarność database on Polish representation in EWCs (June 2001). In this way, a population of 113 companies with EWCs was selected from among the 500 largest foreign investors in Poland.
Within this group, according to the Solidarność data, Polish workforces are fully represented in their company's EWC in 16 companies (14.2 percent of cases); in a further 25 (22.1 percent), they are present only as observers; in another 24 (21.2 percent), either the issue is being negotiated or there are informal contacts between the EWC and Polish unions. In the remaining 48 companies (42.6 percent), there are no known links between the EWC and Polish unions. These figures are provisional, and should be treated with caution. MNCs outside the 500 largest foreign investors in the country are not considered, and there may be some cases of EWC integration unknown to Solidarność, although they must be rare given the three years of meticulous data collection behind its survey.
This estimate is more favourable than the EC assessment for two main reasons. First, the absolute number of documented EWCs with Polish members or observers is 41, as against the 23 recorded by the EC/ETUI. In relative terms, the difference is even sharper, since the denominator (only large investors) is here much smaller: the proportion is 36.2 percent instead of 11.2 percent. Using the EC total of investors with EWCs (206), the percentage would be only 19.9 percent, but this would hide the fact that in many cases the absence of Polish representatives probably reflects (Matla, 2003) . The 'enlargement' of nearly all EWCs may be expected to coincide with the official EU enlargement.
In the Companies: Unexpected Local and Transnational Effects
Case studies allow an in-depth examination of the company-level implications of EWCs. A sample of 10 companies was selected, diversified on the basis of home-country nationality, geographic location, economic sector, and level of integration with the EWC. Access was obtained in six of these, 5 representing different countries (two from the USA, two from France, one from Denmark, and one from Germany), sectors (four in metalworking, one in energy, and one in construction), and different levels of integration with the EWC (from none to full). All research sites were brownfield. Each case study included interviews with trade union representatives, personnel managers, and (on the phone) with western members of the EWC, which were carried out between July and November 2001.
Case studies shed light on some complex dynamics at work within EWCs (see Table 2 ). The process of integration follows the path information-negotiation-observer-full membership. However, the exact meaning of the different stages varies across cases. Negotiations can be more or less difficult, lasting from a few months to several years. The The politically highly sensitive issue of relocations did emerge, but on closer examination it was not treated differently from relocations within the West or even within single western countries (as within Germany in US1). Nor were relocations to Poland a common occurrence in the six case-study companies: on the contrary, there had been more relocations from the East to the West than in the opposite direction. Interestingly enough, the toughest East-West interunion conflict reported regarded a case of relocation from the Czech Republic to Germany at DK. This apparent paradox should not surprise us, considering the important divestments and redundancies foreign investors often carry through when acquiring large post-communist manufacturing operations. Such factories are frequently characterized by low productivity and old technology, so that the new owners often resort to closing down what can be replaced by more state-of-the-art operations in western Europe. In addition, the high import content of foreign operations in Poland means that they often create more jobs in the West than they destroy. 6 In this regard, it is also interesting that Polish representatives firmly reject, at least overtly, social dumping strategies, and they are perfectly aware of the risks of a 'race to the bottom', since Ukraine and Lithuania are just beyond the border offering even lower labour costs. The Polish unionists see themselves as midway between high-wage and low-wage areas, and try to consider both sides of the cost-competition problem.
From interviews with both western and eastern representatives, no serious problem emerged in East-West cooperation and understanding, although each group acknowledged they still had too little knowledge of each other's situation. Culturally, the only apparent difference seemed to be a lower Polish sensitivity to equal opportunities, but that sensitivity is not high in western EWCs either and the gap may be compensated for by the higher feminization of Polish EWC representatives. Only one case of open East-West rivalry was found. When at FR2 central management proposed to upgrade the status of the Polish EWC representatives from observers to full members and to increase their number from two to five (according to the proportional quotas agreed in the West), some western members protested, fearing that a large Polish presence could challenge the cohesion of the employee side. In the same company, serious rivalry on relocations and investments had occurred between Italian and Polish representatives, suggesting that in some delicate situations East-West divisions may still emerge.
Western interviewees were slightly more hesitant, adding qualifications on union cooperation in the EWC: 'there haven't been big problems so far' (DE) and 'mutual understanding is difficult when standards are so different' (DK). The same sort of qualifications could be found on EU enlargement: 'there will be even more strains on wages . . . I agree with the opening, but in a sensible way' (DE). Nevertheless, they generally acknowledged that before meeting CEE representatives they had feared even worse working and union conditions in those countries.
As far as the effect on Polish industrial relations is concerned, while it was confirmed that the direct substantial impact of EWCs is negligible (as within the pre-enlargement EU), two indirect effects were detected. The first (which will be called the 'information effect') did not affect decisions directly, but fostered a change in rhetoric, which is not an insignificant factor for bargaining, consent, and mobilization. 7 While foreign investors usually exploit their western provenance as a justification for implementing change, and cite western developments to force the unions into a defensive and traditionalist image (on the refrain 'you don't know how the world economy and the free market work, we do'), after EWC integration a 180º change occurs. It is now the unions who refer to western practices as models, with management now tending to stress Polish distinctiveness and the impossibility of applying western standards.
There seems to be a strong correlation between the level of EWC integration and the nature of the rhetoric (Figure 1 ). Local managers used frequent pro-western arguments at US1, where there was virtually no East-West union contact, implying that Polish trade unions should learn from the West. 'Polish labour law is pro-union. On the Polish scene, whatever happens, trade unions always rule' (US1). Managers also used western models to criticize the Polish reality at DE and US2, where the Polish participation in the EWC was still hampered by company noncooperation. 'Western trade unions care about unemployment, they defend jobs; Polish unions don't, they just demand higher wages for those who have jobs' (DE). 'Polish trade unions are privileged . . . Polish labour law is too rigid' (US2). But in these two cases, the situation was already changing. The US2 manager had to acknowledge that labour law in western Europe is not that flexible, and at DE it was the union which charged management with 'using Stalinist methods'. The communist insult was returned.
The situation, finally, changes completely once the unions have stable contacts with their western counterparts. Here, it was the trade unions that enjoyed mentioning western realities to censure local management as backward. EWC members expressed admiration not only for western social standards in general, but more precisely for union rights and sector-level collective bargaining. 'Just when we went to the meeting in Germany, a strike was going on down there; witnessing the strike was the most interesting experience for us, I don't know whether it was good for the company [that we were present]' (DK). The reaction by managers was to say that comparing makes no sense. 'Unionists compare all the time. We do not, because we keep in mind that the conditions are different' (DK). 'Comparisons occur, but from the union side, and also from posted workers. Comparisons often lead to populist slogans, but fortunately not yet during negotiations' (FR1). The process of rhetoric reversion was complete when managers started to praise Polish unions as compared to western ones. The following statement is exactly the opposite of that from the DE manager mentioned earlier. ' Here people understand that unions should not damage the company, while there [in the EU] what dominates is economic radicalism. Poles have nothing to learn from western trade unions' (FR1).
More substantially, although a systematic comparison of collective agreements had been done only at DK, Polish unionists were particularly interested in comparing not wage levels (they were perfectly aware that wage harmonization was not feasible), but inter-firm differentials (which are in Poland two or three times larger than in similar western operations) and non-monetary employment conditions such as health and safety. At FR1, Polish unions managed to push through some new arrangements by arguing that they already existed, and worked, in western plants. This suggests that the 'coercive comparisons' MNCs operate on employment conditions can also occur in the opposite direction, exerting an upward pressure on work conditions. The EWCs are a privileged channel for such upward pressures. These dynamics of workplace bargaining rhetoric are associated with different views on EU accession, seen by the unions as desirable, but by some managers as 'an unavoidable disaster' involving 'rigidity and bureaucracy, which do not fit with our situation' (FR1).
The second effect (which will be labelled the 'legitimacy effect') was on the nature of alliances within the companies concerned. Existing literature on EWCs has usually highlighted the scope for (class-based) 'The local rep went to the EWC meeting to complain that here we are excessively zealous because in the other countries they do not restructure in the same way. But how we restructure is our national business, it is not acceptable that the company decides these things centrally. But the unions have a socialist nostalgia for centralism, now it is at the European level. Responsibility should be at the national level, and the EWC should only be an informative body' (FR1 local manager). While the most important contact for the legitimacy effect was with headquarters management, it should be noted that any contact with the West has a similar potential. In this regard, it is East-West relations, more than the employer-employee divide, that matter. Most significantly, at US2 unionists drew a singular comparison between the EWC and western research institutions. While only the former has an employee-defence function, for the respondents, both shared a more important feature: their western origin. 'Any contact we have with the West impresses the local management, even the one with you [researcher]' (US2). A related factor is the very low level of awareness about the EWCs among Polish managers: in some other companies included in the original sample, they only discovered the existence of such a body from the researcher. Unionists' better information, together with both the indirect effects described, may lead to a more assertive role for Polish unions in MNCs, although they do not alone guarantee a recovery of levels of unionization (which were either stable or declining in all the case-study companies).
On the side of local management, both effects pushed them into a defensive position against both the EWC and central management. When local management consisted of Poles and not of expatriates, such defence also took on a nationalist dimension. 'Some foreign companies have a negative effect on Poland because they try to introduce alien forms of organization, without considering the local specificity. It takes them up to 4-5 years to understand their mistakes and to give back the responsibility to Polish managers' (DE).
Surely, this is not necessarily the common trend in all MNCs operating in Poland. Rudolf (2001) mentions an opposite case, in which the Polish representatives in an EWC meeting demanded more autonomy for the local management. However, the novelty and the potentially wideranging effects of the processes detected at FR1, FR2, US2, and DE deserve attention, for they introduce new, unexpected dynamics in international human resource management in the CEE.
Conclusion
Debates on FDI in the CEE and on EU enlargement, especially in the candidate countries and in neighbouring countries, often have emotional and dramatizing tones. The arguments and the findings presented in this article may serve to allay some of the concerns about the industrial relations consequences of integration between western and eastern Europe. The process of the 'enlargement' of EWCs to include Poland is well under way (more than a third of MNCs with an EWC have already done so), and has, so far, been relatively smooth and productive. Polish employee representatives do not differ substantially from their western counterparts in either their ability to engage effectively with the EWC nor in their expectations of the institution. Relocations have not proved to be the compelling threat that is sometimes feared, and occur westwards as much as eastwards. This suggests that unionists from the two sides of the former iron curtain may be more likely than some commentators expect to be able to find a common standpoint, since the problem is similar for both. At least in this case, there is no reason to doubt that EU labour regulations are compatible with CEE environments. Furthermore, at least in MNCs with a strong interest in production standardization, the EWC can become a temporary tactical ally for headquarters management in order to increase transparency, trust, information, and control. As a consequence, FDI may have not only downward, but also upward effects on social standards and employment conditions. Generally speaking, in the Polish case investigation supports the 'realist' view of EWCs: optimistic expectations of their impact should be downgraded, but we should also discount the most pessimistic views of EWCs as redundant bureaucracies or purely channels for national union interests. Even though they hardly have any direct impact on substantive industrial relations, EWCs have a number of indirect effects that can, in the long term, modify the power balance within MNCs.
As to these indirect effects, the investigation has detected two (information and legitimacy) that can both be labelled 'short circuits'. These are, however, very different from the 'short circuits' often feared with regard to East-West economic integration. According to such fears, as in some 'union pessimism' (Meardi, 2002) , the creation of larger product markets including countries with very different industrial relations arrangements would introduce unprecedented strain on the 'European social model'.
The 'short circuits' detected in the case studies are of a different nature. They are caused by the EWCs' hidden effects that make the existing expectations and representations of capitalist labour relations suddenly clash with the actual western reality. There are two such effects. The first, the 'information effect', modifies or even reverses management's pro-western rhetoric. Suddenly, the actually existing West becomes a rhetorical resource for the unions. The second EWC effect, of 'legitimacy', is more organizational and allows Polish representatives to bypass local management and to use against it newly obtained central visibility and access to the headquarters. In both cases, the 'short circuit' consists of the sudden interruption of an employer-union tension based on the monopoly by the former of both western rhetoric and authority. Suddenly, the 'negative' pole of this tension (the unions) has direct access to the same 'energy': reference to western models and contact with central management.
5 Because of confidentiality undertakings, companies are not referred to by name, but by an abbreviation indicating the country of origin (see Table 2 ). 6 This is broadly confirmed by studies on the employment effects on the home countries of FDI into the CEE (Boeri and Brücker, 2000; Gradev, 2001 ) and into Poland in particular (Domański, 2001) . The OECD (2000) confirms that FDI into Poland has not contributed to export growth, as foreign investors have focused on the Polish domestic market. Generally speaking, the trade balance of accession countries with the EU is heavily negative. 7 There is a consistent body of literature on how rhetoric and beliefs have affected Polish industrial relations and led to union acquiescence (Hardy and Rannie, 1995; Meardi, 2000 Meardi, , 2001 Ost and Weinstein, 1999) . More generally, it has been authoritatively argued that the overall importance of human resource management lies not in the 'objective reality of its normative models and their implementation but in the phenomenological reality of its rhetoric' (Legge, 1995: 84) .
